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debate, at present, rests upon a
complex set of modeling choices.

In recent decades, modernization theory
has been challenged. Studies have
found that richer countries are more
likely to maintain democratic rule, but
that the initial transition to democracy
is unrelated to economic development,
or that even the former relationship is
spurious, disappearing once country
fixed-effects are accounted for. 1 Others
counter that the relationship between
development and democracy is restored
if historical data stretching back to the
nineteenth century is incorporated,
if different estimators are used, or
when conditioning the relationship on
institutional or leadership changes
taking place. 2 Thus, the modernization
* This piece is a shortened and revised version of
the article “Economic Development and Democracy:
An Electoral Connection”, European Journal of
Political Research (forthcoming 2018).
1) Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A. &
Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development.
New York: Cambridge University Press. Acemoglu,
D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A. & Yared, P. (2008).
“Income and Democracy.” American Economic
Review 98(3): 808–842; Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S.,
Robinson, J.A. & Yared, P. (2009). “Reevaluating
the Modernization Hypothesis.” Journal of Monetary
Economics 56(8): 1043–1058.
2) Boix, C. & Stokes, S.C. (2003). Endogenous
Democratization. World Politics 55(4 ): 517-49; Che,
Y., Lub, Y., Tao, Z. & Wang, P. (2013). “The Impact
of Income on Democracy Revisited.” Journal of
Comparative Economics 41(1): 159–169; Treisman,
D. (2015). “Income, Democracy, and Leader

Left out of this long-running debate
is an explicit consideration of the
outcome – democracy. A priori, there
is no reason to expect economic
development to have uniform effects
across
different
dimensions
of
democracy. Calling for a more nuanced
approach than studying the overall link
between development and democracy,
before subsequently rejecting or
confirming it, we propose that economic
development is differentially related to
various aspects of democracy. This
insight helps account for the fragility
of this relationship in extant studies
and provides guidance to the ongoing
debate about possible mechanisms at
work in the development-democracy
nexus. Specifically, we hypothesize that
development primarily affects electoral
contestation, while its impact on other
aspects of democracy is less clear.
I. Economic Development and
Democracy
Democracy is a many-splendored
concept embracing diverse elements
such as electoral contestation,
constitutionalism, participation, and
deliberation. We argue that economic
development favors the electoral aspect
of democracy while expectations are
ambiguous on other aspects. To convey
this idea we distinguish two players:
citizens and leaders (incumbents).
We assume that citizens of a polity
Turnover.” American Journal of Political Science
59(4): 927-42..
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are more likely to prefer a democratic
regime than its leaders and that
economic development increases the
relative power resources of citizens visà-vis leaders. A richer, better educated,
more urbanized, more connected
citizenry is, by virtue of these traits,
more powerful. 3 Although development
may also enhance the power resources
of leaders, leaders in poor countries
are already in control of considerable
resources, especially in autocratic
states. Thus, we expect economic
development to have a differential effect
on the power resources of citizens and
leaders, with citizens improving their
relative position as a society develops.
However, acquiring more power
resources is insufficient for ensuring
a democratic outcome. No citizen can
effectively challenge an incumbent
leader alone. For citizens to affect the
character of national institutions, they
must overcome their collective action
dilemma. A critical feature distinguishing
electoral institutions from others is the
role that elections play as a focal point
for mitigating collective action problems
that would otherwise constrain popular
mobilization. This protects against
democratic backsliding, helping to
ensure that electoral institutions,
once established, are respected.
The focal role of elections stems from
several key features: Elections are
high-stakes endeavors; elections are
highly visible, and often intensively
3) Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization,
Cultural Change, and Democracy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Rueschemeyer, D.,
Stephens, E.H. & Stephens, J.D.. (1992). Capitalist
Development and Democracy. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
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canvassed by the media and informal
networks; actions that impair election
quality – e.g., voter intimidation or denial
of access to the ballot to a major party–
are often fairly easy to discern; and
elections occur during a short and welldelimited period of time and culminate
in a single event, the announcement of
a winner. At this point, it is natural for
large numbers of people to mobilize if
their preferences are not respected.
These characteristics set elections
apart from other aspects of democracy,
and the prospect of collective
action ought to make leaders think
twice before blatantly manipulating
them. By contrast, infringements on
non-electoral features of democracy
such as civil liberties, should not provide
as clear a focal point as major electoral
fraud or the cancellation of elections.
Using various tools of repression, great
damage may be done to civil liberties,
for example, without a high level of
public awareness and without a single
galvanizing event necessarily prompting
the general public to take action.
When citizens are empowered by
education and wealth they are more
able to resist the blandishments and
coercions of the leader and more
likely to behave in a peaceful and
orderly manner. This is most obvious
for vote-buying, a common strategy
of electoral fraud. Mired in poverty,
even public-spirited citizens may sell
their votes for a modest sum. Well-off
citizens, by contrast, are less likely to
do so, or will require larger payments,
raising the cost of vote-buying.
Importantly, focal points operate only
where elections already exist. This
suggests that development might
only have an impact on maintaining
electoral democracy but not on the
initial transition to electoral rule.
Hence, our argument suggests that
once established, elections will

combine with economic development to
form a safeguard against deterioration
in electoral democracy. But before
electoral institutions are in place, our
argument has no clear implications
for how economic development might
affect the fate of electoral democracy.
II. Main Results
We assume that economic development
involves a set of factors, including
income, industrialization, changing
sectoral
composition,
education,
communications infrastructure, and
urbanization. As such, economic
development typically entails both
increased specialization in production,
labor and capital markets, and social
reorganization for example with a
growing urban middle class. Since
the aforementioned indicators of
economic development are causally
inter-related and highly correlated,
we adopt the common strategy
to use log GDP per capita as a
proxy for the composite concept.
To test the association between income
and democracy we employ an ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimator with
country and year fixed effects, a lagged
dependent variable (LDV), and robust
errors clustered by country. Rightside variables are lagged one period
behind the outcome and country-year
is the unit of analysis. The time-series
extends for more than 100 years
and sometimes up to two centuries.
We begin with measures focusing
on non-electoral components of
democracy. This includes four mesolevel indices from V-Dem that measure
Liberal, Participatory, Deliberative,
and Egalitarian components of
Additional
V-Dem
democracy. 4
4) Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S.I.,
Skaaning, S.E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard,
M., Fish, S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Knutsen, C.H.,
Krusell, J., Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K.L., McMann,
K., Mechkova, V., Olin, M., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D.,
Pernes, J., Petrarca, C.S., von Römer, J.. Saxer, L.,

8

indices that we test measure more
specific aspects of democracy. All
measures are re-scaled to a 0-1 scale.
Coefficient plots for GDP per capita,
estimated from these tests, are shown
in Figure 1. Income predicts none of
the twelve non-electoral measures
of democracy (with the expected
sign). Robustness tests (not shown)
suggest that some of these measures
are related to income in some model
specifications; but none are very robust.
Next, we examine composite indices
commonly used to measure democracy
in its entirety (following different
understandings of the concept). This
includes Polity2, Unified Democracy
Scores, and the Political Rights and Civil
Liberties indices from Freedom House. 5
Results shown in Figure 1 suggest
that
these
composite
indices
are not clearly linked to income.
Further, we examine three indices
that focus primarily on the electoral
component of democracy: the binary
measure (“BMR”) from Boix et al.,
which captures whether the legislature
Seim, B., Sigman, R., Staton, J., Stepanova, N. &
Wilson, S. (2017). V-Dem [Country-Year/CountryDate] Dataset v7.1. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
Project; Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S.I.,
Skaaning, S.E., Teorell, J., Krusell, J., Marquardt,
K.L., Mechkova, V., Pemstein, D., Pernes, J., Saxer,
L., Stepanova, N., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y. & Wilson,
S. (2017). V-Dem Methodology v7.1. Varieties
of Democracy (V-Dem) Project; Pemstein, D.,
Marquardt, K.L., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y., Krusell, J.
& Miri, F. (2017). The V-Dem Measurement Model:
Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and
Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data. University
of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute:
Working Paper No. 21, 2nd edition.
5) Marshall, M., Gurr, T. & Jaggers, K. (2014).
Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.
html; Pemstein, D., Meserve, S.A. & Melton, K.
(2010). Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable
Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type.
Political Analysis 18(4): 426-449; Freedom House.
(2014). Freedom in the World Survey, http://www.
freedomhouse.org (last visited 4/11 2016).
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Figure 1: Income and various measures of democracy

Notes: The plot displays coefficient estimates surrounded by 95% confidence intervals. Regressions are OLS with LDV, country- and year fixed effects,
and errors clustered by country. Right-side variables measured at T-1. Scales normalized to 0-1 (1=most democratic)

and executive are chosen (directly or
indirectly) in free and fair elections
where at least a majority of adult men
are enfranchised (the inclusion of
suffrage is the only departure from a
purely electoral indicator, following our
definition); the Lexical Index of Electoral
Democracy (“Lexical”), a cumulative
aggregation of indicators capturing
whether national elections are held,
opposition parties can run, elections are
competitive, and suffrage is inclusive;
and an index of Electoral Contestation
based on different V-Dem indicators
including measures of Freedom of
Association, Clean Elections, and
Executive Selection combined through
multiplication. 6 All indices bear a
6) Boix, C., Miller, M.K. & Rosato, S. (2013). A
Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-2007.
Comparative Political Studies 46(12): 1523-1554;
Skaaning, S.E., Gerring, J. & Bartusevičius, H.
(2015). A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy.

positive relationship to income, though
BMR does not surpass conventional
thresholds of statistical significance.
Finally, we examine indicators that are
tightly focused on electoral democracy,
constituting our core dependent
variables. Competitive Elections from
Lexical measures the existence of
contested multi-party elections without
any consideration of suffrage. Next, we
use the V-Dem index Clean Elections
based on eight indicators (presented
below). For years where national
elections are not on track, because
they have not been introduced or
discontinued due to coups, etc., the
score is 0. For indicators observed
only in election years, scores are
repeated within election regime periods
as defined by V-Dem. These electoral
Comparative Political Studies 48(12): 1491-1525.

9

measures are strongly correlated with
prior levels of income.
To put the latter results in perspective,
an extremely poor country, at $250 USD
per capita GDP, is predicted to hover
around 0.25 on the Clean Elections
index – approximately the level of PRIMexico in the 1980s. Quadrupling that
income, to $1000 USD, the expected
long-run level of Clean Elections
rises by about 0.1. A median-income
country by 2010 standards, roughly
$7300, is expected to score right above
the 0.5 midpoint of Clean Elections
– corresponding (roughly) to late1990’s Ghana. These results suggest
that economic development brings
a substantial shift in the quality of
elections.
We conducted a large number of
additional tests, accounting for
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additional confounders and modeling
the possible endogeneity of income to
democracy. The relationships between
income and our electoral measures of
democracy are very robust. The general
picture emerging from all these tests
is thus that the relationship between
economic development and democracy
depends on an electoral connection.
The more closely an indicator homes
in on the purely electoral component of
democracy, the more sensitive it is to
economic development.
III. Inside the Box
The Clean Elections index offers a
unique opportunity to peek inside the
box of an intriguing relationship. This
index is composed of eight indicators,
all originally coded on five-point ordinal
scales by several country experts and
then transformed to interval-scale
measures by the V-Dem measurement
model.
Four indicators tap into problems of
electoral integrity pertaining to violence

or fraud. Government intimidation
inquires whether opposition candidates,
parties, or campaign workers were
subjected to repression, intimidation,
violence, or harassment by the
government, the ruling party, or their
agents. Other violence asks whether
the campaign period, election day,
and post-election process were free
from other types of campaign/electionrelated violence. Vote buying inquires
into vote and/or turnout buying in an
election. Other irregularities refers to
other irregularities on the part of the
incumbent and/or opposition parties,
such as double IDs, intentional lack
of voting materials, ballot-stuffing,
misreporting of votes, and false
collation of votes.
Three other indicators in Clean
Elections measure the capabilities of
states to manage election processes.
Voter registry asks whether there
was a reasonably accurate voter
registry in place at the time of an

election and whether it was utilized.
EMB capacity measures whether the
Electoral Management Body in charge
of administering national elections
has sufficient staff and resources to
administer a well-run national election.
EMB autonomy measures the ability
of the Election Management Body to
apply election laws and administrative
rules impartially in national elections,
separate from pressures exerted by the
government or governing party.
The final indicator is Free and fair
elections. This provides a summary
judgment of whether the national
election was free and fair.
In Table 1, we regress each outcome on
income in our benchmark.
Notably, all indicators associated with
electoral violence and fraud bear a
strong relationship to income
(Models 1-4) while indicators reflective
of state capacity do not (Models 5-7).

Table 1: Clean Elections, Disaggregated

Note: OLS regression with country and year fixed effects, errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01. Right-side variables measured at T-1.
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Deficiencies in the fraud and violence
indicators are more straightforward for
citizens to connect to the intentional
actions of the government and
other elites than deficiencies in the
capacity variables. Hence, these
analyses provide additional fodder for
our argument that a richer economy
empowers citizens to deter leaders
from engaging in blatant manipulation
of elections and weakens the incentives
of leaders to do so.
IV. Upturns and Downturns
Finally, we investigate whether the
relationship between income and
electoral democracy is symmetric
or asymmetric. Does economic
development enhance the probability
of upturns (transitions to greater
democracy) and reduce the probability
of downturns (to greater autocracy)? Or
does it only affect downturns?
Using Competitive Elections and Clean
Elections along with a third measure that
registers the existence of an Electoral
Regime (where regular elections
are on course), we ran regressions
differentiating movements toward and
away from electoral democracy. Results
support the asymmetric hypothesis.
Higher income discourages downturns,
but does not clearly encourage
upturns. 7 These results conform with
our theoretical expectation that a
combination of economic development
and pre-existing elections should
prevent leaders from discontinuing
elections, or blatantly manipulating
them.
V. Conclusion
7) One exception is when we test dynamic probit
models for Competitive Elections. Here, we find a
positive coefficient both on onset and survival of
competitive elections. Since this measure extends
back to 1800, the result corresponds well with those
in Boix & Stokes (2003), suggesting that economic
development might have had a stronger influence on
democratic transitions in the 19th century.

The relationship between economic
development and democracy is robust
only with respect to the electoral
component of democracy, narrowly
construed as the existence of
competitive national elections and the
procedural integrity of the electoral
process. Other aspects of democracy
are not, or only weakly, related to
income. This may help to explain why
tests employing composite indices
such as Polity2 or Freedom House
show inconsistent results, depending
on choice of model specifications.
We also find that while economic
development prevents backsliding
in electoral democracy it does not
show a significant relationship to
democratization, corroborating the
thesis of asymmetric effects.
We proposed a theoretical framework
that may explain the differential effects
of economic development on different
aspects of democracy. Development
reduces the relative power and alters
the utility calculus of leaders, who are
in a position to respect or subvert multiparty elections. Development raises
the direct costs of subversion (e.g.,
through vote-buying) while lowering the
opportunity costs of leaving office. Yet,
citizens of rich countries cannot simply
push through institutional changes of
any kind. Elections play a focal role,
providing a coordination mechanism for
citizens who wish to see the “will of the
people” respected.
Regarding our contribution to the
wider “modernization debate”, we note
that different explanations – not only
(versions of) modernization theory -are consistent with the prediction that
development affects democracy, but
not with the more nuanced patterns
that we find in the data. Our theoretical
argument, which is consistent with
the observed patterns, incorporates
elements familiar to some classic
formulations of modernization theory
11

(power resources of citizens increasing
with development) but also elements
that modernization theorists have
typically overlooked (the role of focal
points for citizen action against the
regime). Further, our empirical findings
point towards a potential reconciliation
of the long-running debate between
proponents and skeptics of the
notion that development leads to
democracy. Just as Przeworski and
colleagues called attention to possible
asymmetries between democratization
and democratic consolidation we have
called attention to another nuance;
economic development affects some
aspects of democracy more than
others. While we don’t expect this
nuance to definitively settle the debate,
it will hopefully contribute to a more
fine-grained discussion. Rather than
trying to prove that the “modernization
hypothesis” is entirely true or entirely
false, scholars might think about the
varying strength of this relationship in
different contexts.

